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Abstract
This paper provides an empirical examination of the economic impact of the Democratic
and Republican National Conventions on local economies. Our analysis from 1970-2005 of the
50 largest metropolitan areas in the country, including all cities that have hosted one of the
national conventions during this time period, finds that the presence of the Republican or the
Democratic National Convention has no discernable impact on employment, personal income, or
personal income per capita in the cities where the events were held confirming the results of
other ex post analyses of mega-events.
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1. Introduction 
 Convention tourism is big business in the United States. According to the Convention 
Industry Council, in 2004 the meetings, conventions, exhibitions, and incentive travel industry 
generated over $122.3 billion in direct spending and 1.7 million jobs. These figures are “more 
than the pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing industry and only slightly less than the 
nursing and residential care facilities industry.” (CIC, 2005) In hopes of gaining of piece of this 
lucrative business, cities compete vigorously to host meetings and conventions, and billions of 
dollars of taxpayer money has been directed towards the construction of ever larger and more 
elaborate convention centers in cities all across the country.  
Perhaps the most sought-after jewels of the convention industry nationwide are the 
quadrennial National Democratic and Republican Conventions at which each party’s presidential 
candidate is nominated. City and party officials suggest that these events generate significant 
economic windfalls for host cities and also serve to focus national and even international 
attention on the host city. For example, city officials of New York City and Boston claimed net 
economic impacts of $255 million and $156 million, respectively, for the 2004 Republican and 
Democratic National Conventions. These economic impact numbers figured prominently in press 
releases promoting the 2008 Republican Convention in St. Paul/Minneapolis.  
Economists, however, tend to be more skeptical of the large economic impact numbers 
touted by event organizers. Our examination of 18 national political conventions from 1972-
2004 suggests that the promoters’ rosy economic projections are overstated, and these events 





 Economic impact analyses are divided into two main categories: ex ante studies and ex 
post studies. Ex ante studies predict the economic effect of an event by estimating the number of 
visitors to the event as well as their average expenditures. A multiplier is typically also applied to 
these direct economic impact figures resulting in a total impact number that is often at least twice 
as large as the direct economic impact. As noted previously, ex ante studies of national political 
conventions routinely ascribe large benefits to these major events. 
 Critics of ex ante economic analysis, however, point out that these studies often suffer 
from three major shortcomings that lead to an overestimation of the total net impact of these 
events. First, ex ante reports often fail to account for the substitution effect which occurs when 
local residents spend their money on convention-related activities rather than on other goods and 
services in the local economy. As the Democratic and Republican national conventions primarily 
draw delegates from across the country rather than from local areas, the substitution effect in 
these cases is likely to be relatively small compared with, for example, a county or state political 
convention.   
 The second concern in ex ante studies is the crowding out effect. The large crowds and 
congestion associated with “mega-events” like the national conventions may deter people not 
associated with the convention from engaging in economic activities in the host city. While 
hotels, bars and restaurants, may do well during the convention, other retailers and service 
providers may not benefit from the event and potentially could lose sales. This issue is of 
particular concern during a national political convention which necessitates a high degree of 
security and also may generate large crowds of protesters both of which will serve to dissuade 
casual shoppers and diners and result in major disruptions for local residents. During the week of 
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the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York City, for example, attendance at 
Broadway shows fell more than 20 percent compared with the same week a year earlier despite 
the presence of tens of thousands of visiting conventioneers and journalists. 
Many economists are also skeptical of the multipliers used in ex ante studies to generate 
indirect economic benefits. Often the multipliers used are absurdly high, but even more careful 
estimates of multipliers may be viewed with suspicion. Multipliers are calculated using complex 
input-output tables for specific industries grounded in inter-industry relationships within regions 
based upon an economic area’s normal production patterns. During mega-events, however, the 
economy within may be anything but normal, and therefore, these same inter-industry 
relationships may not hold. Since there is no reason to believe the usual economic multipliers 
apply during major events, any economic analyses based upon these multipliers may, therefore, 
be highly inaccurate (Matheson, 2004). 
In particular, national conventions may result in large windfalls to national restaurant and 
hotel chains and provide employment opportunities for hospitality workers and journalists from 
across the country but may not result in significant wage gains for local employees. In this 
situation, the economic gain from the event does not accrue to the host city but rather benefits the 
bottom line back at corporate headquarters. It is local taxpayers, however, who are often asked to 
foot the fill for convention center expansions and who suffer from the disruptions associated with 
the event.  
Finally, convention promoters often suggest that prominent events such as the Republican 
and Democratic National Conventions give cities immeasurable benefits in terms of national and 
international exposure by being placed in an intense media spotlight. While this contention may 
be true, it must be realized that the attention a city receives may not portray the city in a positive 
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light. In the realm of sporting events, the Summer Olympic Games in 1972 in Munich and in 
1996 in Atlanta were marred by terrorist incidents, and Salt Lake City’s reputation suffered after 
the bribery scandal surrounding its bid for the 2002 Winter Olympics. Host cities for political 
conventions are similarly not immune from bad publicity. For example, the chaos and protests 
surrounding the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago is still noteworthy even 40 years later. 
It is hard to imagine that the city of Chicago benefited from its ill-fated moment in the sun.   
Due to the difficulties associated with ex ante estimation, numerous scholars estimate the 
effects of mega-events on local economies by ex post estimation which examines the actual 
economic performance of local areas that host large events. While few ex post studies of 
conventions are found in the existing literature, many authors have examined of major sporting 
events such as the Olympics (Baade and Matheson, 2002; Jasmand and Maennig, 2007) or World 
Cup (Baade and Matheson, 2004; Hagn and Maennig, 2007a; 2007b), the Super Bowl (Porter, 
1999; Baade and Matheson, 2006; Coates, 2006), All-Star Games (Baade and Matheson, 2001; 
Coates, 2006), and post season play in general (Coates and Humphreys, 2002; Coates and 
Depken, 2006; Baade, Baumann, and Matheson, 2008). The overwhelming majority of ex ante 
studies of mega-sporting events find little to no significant positive economic impact from 
hosting these events. If the Republican and Democratic National Conventions are truly the 
“Super Bowl” of the convention business, then based on the evidence of the actual economic 
impact of the Super Bowl, cities hosting national political conventions have every reason to be 
concerned about the real magnitude of the economic windfall they can expect.   
The paper by Coates and Depken (2006) is of particular interest to our study. The authors 
use taxable sales data from individual cities in Texas to measure the economic gains from 
hosting a variety of sporting events including the Super Bowl and the World Series. Houston also 
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hosted the 1992 Republican National Convention, and Coates and Depken include a control 
variable for this event. They find that “the political convention reduced taxable sales by $19 
million and reduced sales tax revenues by approximately $1.4 million.” 
 
The Model 
Two types of data have been used most frequently in the existing ex post studies for 
professional sports. Coates and Humphreys (1999; 2002; 2003), Baade and Matheson (2001; 
2004; 2006), Hagn and Maennig (2007b), and Jasmand and Maennig (2007) use annual data on 
employment, personal income, or personal income per capita over a wide number of cities and 
years to estimate the economic impact of sporting events. Clearly annual data is not ideal when 
examining events with a relatively small duration such as a political convention. To this end, 
other studies such as Porter (1999), Baade and Matheson (2001), Coates (2006), Coates and 
Depken (2006), and Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2008) have used taxable sales data that are 
available at a monthly or quarterly basis. Taxable sales data, however, cannot be used in 
nationwide panels of political conventions because of cross-state differences in data availability 
and taxation laws. This leaves two options: examining any political conventions that have taken 
place in a single state using high frequency data or examining a large panel of conventions using 
annual data. This paper uses the panel approach to look at multiple conventions over the period 
1972-2004. 
As noted by Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2008), there are several approaches to 
estimate the impact of an event on a city. Mills and McDonald (1992) provide an extensive 
summary of these models, which seek to identify changes in economic activity through changes 
in key economic variables in the short-run or the identification of long-term developments that 
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enhance the capacity for growth. Our task is not to replicate explanations of metropolitan 
economic growth, but to use past work to help identify any effects of political conventions on 
economic indicators. To this end we have selected explanatory variables from existing models to 
predict economic activity in the absence of the convention. Estimating the economic impact of a 
convention involves accounting for normal activity and determining whether the presence of an 
event of such national prominence increases economic activity. Thus, this approach depends on 
our ability to identify variables that account for the variation in growth in economic activity in 
host cities. 
Our model estimates the changes in the growth rates of real personal income, 
employment, and real per capita income attributable to political conventions in host cities 
between 1969 and 2005. We use a sample of 50 metropolitan standardized areas (MSAs) that 
have at least one million residents in 2005. This sample includes the 14 MSAs that hosted a 
political convention (see Table 1) and a control group of MSAs that have not hosted a political 
convention. Most of the host cities are relatively large compared to the rest of the sample. The 
smallest MSA is Kansas City, which had a population of just under two million in 2005. For this 
reason, we use growth rates to compare cities of different sizes and also present estimations. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of real personal income, employment, real per capita 
income, and population.  
The following is our baseline model for the estimations:  
 ititititit0it  CON OTHER POP   =Y εαγββββ ++++++ 321      (1) 
There are three different dependent variables ( ): the growth rates of real personal 
income, employment, and real per capita income in year t and MSA i.  is the log 




since the dependent variable is already scaled by the population size.  is a vector of 
dummy variables that represents other important economic events specific to an area that would 
not be captured in the national economic business cycle or overall city growth rate. Examples of 
such deviations include the tech boom in Silicon Valley during 1999 and 2000, the oil boom and 
bust cycles in the 70s and 80s in oil-producing cities, and Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans 
during 2005.  For example, New Orleans in 2005 produces the minimum of each dependent 
variable in Table 2. The specific variables, cities, and years included in  is available 
from the authors upon request.  equals one if the MSA hosted a political convention that 
year and zero otherwise. Finally, to account for the panel nature of our data, we include controls 




tγ ) and MSA ( iα ). Ideally, this specification allows MSAs to have different 
intercepts and also purges national trends. In other versions of this model, we also included 
controls for city-specific trends as well, but this addition added little explanatory power and did 
not impact our main results.  
We use several tests to ensure the dependent variables do not exhibit a unit root. First, we 
perform Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for each city and each dependent variable. For 
all three dependent variables, 48 of the 50 cities pass both tests at five percent. Of the other two 
cities, one passes both tests at ten percent (Washington, D.C.), and one fails both tests (New 
Orleans). We also perform unit root tests on the entire panel using tests from Levin, Lin, and Chu 
(2002) and Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003), which allow for panel-specific attributes such as 
differing time trends and autoregressive paths. Both tests reject the existence of a unit root in all 
three dependent variables.   
Given the time-series nature of the data, the error term in equation (1) is likely to be 
autocorrelated. While ordinary least squares regressions will produce consistent estimates, the 
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standard errors will be incorrect. We use a test suggested by Wooldridge (2002) for 
autocorrelation within each panel, which estimates ittiit u+= −1,ˆˆ ερε . Under the null hypothesis 
no autocorrelation, 5.0−=ρ , and all three dependent variables reject the null.  
 One method to account for the autocorrelation is to include an autoregressive component, 
which changes our estimation model to  
 itiiitititti0it  t CFB TECH POPY   Y εαγβββββ +++++++= − 4321,1 .    (2) 
Introducing a lagged dependent variable requires the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation 
technique, which is sometimes referred to as a “difference GMM” model. This model is 
described in several works, including Bond (2002) and Roodman (2006). This model begins by 
differencing equation (1), which purges iα . Once the city-specific effect is removed, the model 
uses higher-order lags of  to instrument for itY 1, −Δ tiY . Any other independent variables that are 
believed to be endogenous or predetermined (i.e., variables independent to the current error but 
not previous errors) can be handled in the same way.  
Given T = 35, there are 34 observations of the differenced dependent variable ( ) for 
each city. Given the first lag of the differenced dependent variable is endogenous ( ), all of 
the remaining 32 higher-order lags can be used as instruments for 
itYΔ
1, −Δ tiY
itYΔ . While the higher-order 
lags should create missing values in practice, Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) show that 
each instrument produces a useful moment condition. In other words, consider the moment 
condition , where  contains the instruments (i.e., the higher-order lags) and 0][ ' =Δ ititZE ε
'
itZ itεΔ  




ittiy ε  if ; for the third-order lag instrument, the moment condition is 





Consistency of this approach requires the error terms are independently and identically 
distributed, which is typically cannot be assumed in dynamic panel models.  For example, it is 
plausible the variance of the error term (original or differenced) may differ across cities. A 
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vvv '1' 11 .  
To obtain the weighting matrix, it is necessary to have consistent estimates of iε
vΔ , which 





, where H  is a (T – 2) 
square matrix with 2 on the diagonal, -1 on all of the immediate off-diagonals, and zero 
elsewhere. Thus, the first-step estimates the model using  to produce the estimates 1W itε
)Δ , 
which the second step uses in the weighting matrix W . While this correction produces the 
desirable asymptotic properties, several works (Arellano and Bond, 1991 and Blundell and Bond, 
1998, to name only two) suggest the standard errors in the second step are downward biased. We 
use the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction to adjust the standard errors. Finally, one 
concern with the Arellano and Bond (1991) technique is over-identifying restrictions, especially 
given the relatively long time period for each city in our data. We use a Hansen (1982) test to 
determine the number of over-identifying restrictions.  
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Table 3 presents the Arellano-Bond estimation results of equation (2) using each of the 
three dependent variables. For brevity, we omit the estimates for the year dummies and the 
 controls, but these are available upon request. The Arellano-Bond tests for 
autoregressive errors produce the expected result. These tests suggest autocorrelation exists in 
the first lag, which is expected and justifies the inclusion of the first difference of each dependent 
variable. In addition, the same test suggests a second lag term is not necessary for any of the 
dependent variables.  
itOTHER
We find only the weakest evidence that political conventions increase economic activity 
above normal fluctuations. All of the estimated six coefficients (Democratic and Republican 
conventions for employment, personal income, and per capita income) are positive, but none of 
the political convention controls are even close to statistically significant. Because all three 
dependent variables are positively correlated, however, these results are really closer to two 
pieces of evidence of net positive economic activity rather than six.  
 
Conclusions 
 This paper provides an empirical examination of the economic impact of the Democratic 
and Republican National Conventions on local economies. Confirming the results of other ex 
post analyses of mega-events, particularly sporting events, this paper finds no statistically 
significant evidence that these huge conventions contribute positively to a host city’s economy. 
Our analysis from 1970-2005 of the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the country, including all 
cities that have hosted one of the national conventions during this time period, finds that neither 
the presence of the Republican nor the Democratic National Convention has a discernable impact 
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on employment, personal income, or personal income per capita in the cities where the events 
were held.  
While the conventional wisdom regarding national conventions is that they bring fame 
and fortune to host cities, our results suggest that any economic benefits are quite elusive. People 
should view promises of economic windfalls from hosting national political conventions in the 
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Table 1: Political Convention Hosts  
 Democratic National Convention Republican National Convention 
1972 Miami, Convention Center Miami, Convention Center 
1976 Madison Square Garden, New York City Kemper Arena, Kansas City 
1980 Madison Square Garden, New York City Joe Louis Arena, Detroit 
1984 Moscone Center, San Francisco Reunion Arena, Dallas 
1988 The Omni, Atlanta Superdome, New Orleans 
1992 Madison Square Garden, New York City Astrodome, Houston 
1996 United Center, Chicago San Diego Convention Center 
2000 Staples Center, Los Angeles First Union Center, Philadelphia 




Table 2: Summary statistics  
 
Variable mean Standard 
deviation 
minimum maximum 
Percent personal income 
growth  
0.0306 0.0308 -0.3616 0.2083 
Percent employment 
growth 
0.0229 0.0253 -0.0774 0.1468 
Percent personal income 
per capita growth 
0.0157 0.0261 -0.3614 0.1960 
Percent population 
growth  
0.0146 0.0147 -0.0176 0.0936 
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Table 3: Arellano-Bond Estimation Results (standard errors in parentheses), all cities  

































Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) 
z = -4.62 
p = 0.000 
z = -5.03 
p = 0.000 
z = -2.32 
p = 0.021 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2)  
z = -0.92 
p = 0.357 
z = -1.32 
p = 0.188 
z = -0.96 
p = 0.339 
instruments (lags of 
differenced dep. var.)  
2,3,4,5 2,3 2,3,4,5,6 
Hansen test for over-
identification  
2χ = 0.43 2χ = 1.01 2χ = 1.47 
p = 0.933 p = 0.316 p = 0.832 
 
For brevity, we omit the year dummies, city fixed effects, and the coefficients on the vector of 
 variables. Full results are available from the authors upon request. itOTHER
 
***Statistically significant at the 1% significance level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% significance level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% significance level. 
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